Brigham Young University International Law & Management
Review
Volume 6 | Issue 2

Article 5

6-22-2010

Independent Creation and Originality in the Age of
Imitated Reality: A Comparative Analysis of
Copyright and Database Protection for Digital
Models of Real People
Bryce Clayton Newell

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr
Part of the Computer Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bryce Clayton Newell, Independent Creation and Originality in the Age of Imitated Reality: A Comparative Analysis of Copyright and
Database Protection for Digital Models of Real People, 6 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. R. 93 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr/vol6/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
International Law & Management Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

INDEPENDENT CREATION AND ORIGINALITY IN THE AGE OF
IMITATED REALITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
COPYRIGHT AND DATABASE PROTECTION FOR DIGITAL
MODELS OF REAL PEOPLE
Bryce Clayton Newell*

* J.D., University of California, Davis School of Law, May 2010; B.S., Multimedia Communication
Technology, Utah Valley University. I would like to thank Keith Aoki, Robert Clark, Coke Newell,
as well as Michael Jensen and the staff at ILMR for their guidance, time, corrections, and helpful
insights. I would also like to especially thank Aprille, Annalesa, and Caden for all of their love and
support.

93

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 6

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 95
II.THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ART ...................................................... 97
A. The Synthespian: A Brief History ........................................ 98
B. The Holy Grail: A Perfect Clone .......................................... 99
C. Robbing the Grave and Resurrecting the Dead................... 101
D. User-Generated Content: A Small Glimpse into the
Future .................................................................................. 104
III.COPYRIGHT: THE REQUIREMENT OF ORIGINALITY ......................... 104
A. Originality in the United States .......................................... 104
i. The cloning process ...................................................... 109
ii. Meshwerks v. Toyota: Originality and digital models .. 111
B. Originality and Industrious Collection Elsewhere: A
Look at the Law in the United Kingdom and Australia ...... 115
IV.DATABASE PROTECTION FOR DIGITAL MODELS: IS THERE SUCH
A THING? .................................................................................... 120
A. Sui Generis Protection Under the E.U. Database
Directive ............................................................................. 122
V.CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 125

94

SPRING 2010

Independent Creation

“Were I called on to define, very briefly, the term Art, I should call it
‘the reproduction of what the Senses perceive in Nature through the veil
of the soul.’ The mere imitation, however accurate, of what is in Nature,
entitles no man to the sacred name of ‘Artist.’”
– Edgar Allan Poe1
I. INTRODUCTION
Artists have been attempting to reproduce reality through their
artwork for centuries, providing a rich history behind the relationship
between art and imitation. For example, Socrates introduced one popular
concept of imitation, or mimesis, in fifth-century B.C. Athens,2 whereby
stating that “‘imitation’ meant the copying of the appearances of
things.”3 Plato and Aristotle further shaped this idea, theorizing that
imitation resulted from “reflection upon painting and sculpture.”4
Contemporaneous notions reflected the idea that imitation meant
“reproducing the external world,”5 On the other hand, modern discourse
has reiterated Poe’s general sentiment that art and imitation are strange
bedfellows.6 However, in contrast to these modern notions, the United
Nations Education, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), in apparent agreement with Aristotle, has defined an artist as
“any person who creates or gives creative expression to, or re-creates
works of art . . . .”7
Copyright law’s treatment of subject matter drawn from the real
world reflects this dilemma concerning the relationship between art and
imitation. The United States has recently aligned itself with Poe’s
general sentiment. It has done so under the guise of copyright’s

1. THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 59 (Robert Andrews ed., Columbia Univ.
Press 1993).
2. 3 THE DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS: STUDIES OF SELECTED PIVOTAL IDEAS
226 (Philip P. Wiener ed., 1973–74) [hereinafter HISTORY OF IDEAS].
3. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
4. Id.; see also The University of Chicago, Theories of Media, Keywords Glossary,
available at http://csmt.uchicago.edu/glossary2004/mimesis.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
5. 3 HISTORY OF IDEAS, supra note 2.
6. Tom Huhn, The Movement of Mimesis: Heidegger's 'Origin of the Work of Art' in
Relation to Adorno and Lyotard, 22 (4) PHIL. SOC. CRITICISM 45, 46 (1996) (“If mimesis occurs
only as imitation, portrayal, or representation, it remains but a false and falsifying movement.”),
available at http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/22/4/45 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
7. Recommendation Concerning the Status of the Artist: UNESCO, Oct. 27, 1980,
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=13138&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (emphasis added) (last
visited Apr. 15, 2010); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 830 (5th
ed., 2007).
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requirement of originality, requiring an additional authorial “creative
spark”8 that has not always been required in the United States or
elsewhere.
Copyright protects an author’s original expression, as opposed to the
underlying facts or ideas themselves,9 and circumscribes the ability of
others to copy that expression.10 Whether aspects of an artistic imitation
of the real world are the proper subject of copyright appears to be a
settled point in more traditional contexts, such as photography.11
However, recent advancements in digital imaging technology have
allowed digital artists to imitate reality in ways that are both reminiscent
of the old and profoundly new in their application and scope. For
instance, the present ability to digitally model and animate imitations of
real people, places, and things in a virtual three-dimensional environment
has raised a host of new and complicated legal issues, many related to
copyright. In the first federal case to directly address the question, the
Tenth Circuit held that copyright does not protect digital models created
to imitate preexisting objects.12
This Article addresses a few of the issues that confront digital artists
and modeling companies in the context of copyright law’s requirements
of originality and independent creation, and provides a comparative look
at potential protection for these types of digital models under differing
definitions of originality. In an age when “[a]nimators deal with pixels as
well as paint brushes,”13 the laws of the United States potentially offer
digital artists less protection in this context than do the laws of other
countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia. Specifically, the
requirement of originality after Feist and the lack of sui generis database
protection in the United States provide less protection for digital visual

8. Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
9. Id. at 350 (“No author may copyright facts or ideas. The copyright is limited to those
aspects of the work -- termed 'expression' -- that display the stamp of the author's originality.” (citing
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1985))).
10. Feist Publ'ns Inc., 488 U.S. at 350 (“[O]nly the compiler’s [expression] may be protected;
the raw facts may be copied at will.”).
11. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), the Supreme Court found
copyrightable expression in Napoleon Sarony’s photographs of Oscar Wilde “so far as they are
representatives of original intellectual conceptions of the author.” Id. at 58. See also 1-3 NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 3.03[C][3] (2008) (“As applied to a photograph of a pre-existing product, that
bedrock principle [of originality] means that the photographer manifestly cannot claim to have
originated the matter depicted therein . . . .”).
12. Meshwerks Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1006 (2009).
13. Dave Kehr, When a Cyberstar is Born, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, § 2 at 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/18/arts/film-when-a-cyberstar-is-born.html?pagewanted=all (last
visited Mar. 15, 2010).
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effects artists engaged in modeling reality than do the laws of these other
jurisdictions. In Part II, this Article examines some examples of recent
advancements in digital imaging technology; specifically, the ability to
create digital clones of preexisting things, such as living or deceased
personalities and other, non-human, objects. In Part III, the Article
provides a comparative analysis of copyright’s requirement of originality
in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. Part IV presents a
brief look at sui generis protection under the European Union’s recent
directive on the legal protection of databases. Finally, Part V offers a
brief conclusion.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ART
Digital technology is rapidly expanding the artist’s ability to imitate
reality in various ways. In addition to the photograph’s ability to
reproduce reality, digital technology and computer generated imagery
(CGI) enable artists to animate their reproduced subjects in realistic
three-dimensional form, albeit in two-dimensional media. Digital artists
also have the ability to combine digitally created work with photographic
and cinematographic material. As one commentator put it, “C.G.I.
aspires to something different: a reality that is realer than real, more
vivid and more dramatic.”14 This technological evolution looks “toward
what some call the ‘holy grail’ of reanimation—virtual humans who can
see, speak, hear, touch and be touched, exhibit behavior, and think just as
we do.”15 In some cases, both the environment and the actor are digitally
created, or re-created, in photorealistic, or nearly photorealistic, form. “A
character in Jean-Luc Godard’s ‘Petit Soldat’ (1960) memorably
observed that ‘cinema is truth 24 times a second.’ The figure today is
considerably less than that—maybe two or three times a second, at
most.”16
In reality, the digital artist’s processes are really “nothing more than
technologically advanced versions of traditional animation techniques,
with the computer console replacing the drawing board and animation
stand of the past.”17 The most prolific use of CGI to date has not been to

14. Id.
15. Joel Anderson, Note, What's Wrong with this Picture?: Dead or Alive: Protecting Actors
in the Age of Virtual Reanimation, 25 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 155, 155–56 (quoting Joseph J. Beard,
Clones, Bones and Twilight Zones: Protecting the Digital Persona of the Quick, the Dead and the
Imaginary, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 441, 444 (2001)).
16. Kehr, supra note 13.
17. Id.
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create digital actors, synthespians,18 or “create fantastic planets and
sprawling, surreal urban environments,”19 but rather to make smaller,
less noticeable alterations. “Much of the dreamy, nostalgic vision of
Paris in Jean-Pierre Jeunet’s . . . ‘Amelie’ was created by digitally
retouching actual locations—cars were removed from quaint, curving
streets, graffiti was wiped away and perfect clouds were placed in the
Parisian sky.”20 The apparent potential to recreate or imitate reality,
whether modern or historical reality, through CGI is virtually endless.
A. The Synthespian: A Brief History
In recent years, “[v]irtual humans have found steady employment in
the entertainment field.”21 However, despite its recent popularity, the
idea of putting digital actors to work has a relatively long history.
Newspaper cartoonist Winsor McCay created the first “superstar
synthespian” in 1914,22 as Gertie the Dinosaur came to life onstage as
McCay pretended to sketch Gertie on a large drawing board—actually, a
movie screen.23 McCay had meticulously hand-drawn the animated film
frame-by-frame and, as he coaxed Gertie out of hiding to munch some
greens, the synthespian became a reality.24
Following Gertie the Dinosaur, the first celebrity synthespian was
Marilyn Monroe, who died on August 5, 1962, fifteen years before her
appearance in the 1987 independent film “Rendezvous in Montreal.”25
Subsequently, Sky Captain and the World of Tomorrow, released in 2004
by Paramount Pictures, which featured the reanimated clone of Sir
Laurence Oliver, a celebrity who died in 1989. The film depicted Sir
Laurence Oliver performing scenes and engaging in activity the actor had
never participated in while alive,26 and marked “the first time a dead
18. Jeff Kleiser, an L.A. based digital effects expert, coined the term “synthespian” “when he
created the industry's first virtual actor (or "vactor') for his 1988 short film ‘Nestor Sextone for
President.’” Leslie Kurtz, Digital Actors and Copyright—From the Polar Express to Simone, 21
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 783, 783 n.1 (2005). Kleiser derived the term from
the words “synthetic thespian.” Adam Faier, Note, Digital Slaves of the Render Farms?: Virtual
Actors and Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 321, 325 (citing Michael
A. Hiltzik & Alex Pham, Synthetic Actors Guild, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 2001, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/may/08/news/mn-60707 (last visited March 15, 2010)).
19. Kehr, supra note 13.
20. Id.
21. Joseph J. Beard, Clones, Bones and Twilight Zones: Protecting the Digital Persona of the
Quick, the Dead and the Imaginary, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1165, 1169 (2001).
22. Kehr, supra note 13.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Anderson, supra note 15, at 156.
26. Id. at 155.
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actor’s reanimated clone perform[ed] completely original scenes. . . .”27
Such occurrences are now commonplace in today’s digital era. Digital
technology has made it possible to watch video of Abraham Lincoln on
national television,28 digital doubles of the baby in Lemony Snicket’s a
Series of Unfortunate Events and of Tobey Maguire and Alfred Molina
in Spiderman,29 Elton John acting alongside James Cagney, Humphrey
Bogart, and Louis Armstrong, and John Wayne in a beer commercial.30
In Jurassic Park, Robert Patrick’s digital double, having previously
appeared as the “liquid metal cyborg in Terminator 2: Judgment Day,”31
returned to life (and death) as “T-Rex’s meal.”32 Filmmaker Andrew
Niccols captured one of the possible synthespian dilemmas in his 2002
film S1mOne (or “Simone”). In Simone, a struggling movie producer
played by Al Pacino “create[d] a digital replacement when a
temperamental [real-world] actress walk[ed] out in the middle of a
film.”33 When the digital replacement “becomes an overnight sensation,”
however, Pacino’s character struggles to “maintain the fiction that she is
real.”34
B. The Holy Grail: A Perfect Clone
It has been said that the “holy grail” of CGI is to clone a living,
breathing, human being in “photorealistic and perfectly animated” digital
form.35 For years, this rapidly advancing technology has been “begging
for its moment of truth.”36 In 2009, The Curious Case of Benjamin
Button won the Academy Award for Best Visual Effects, and for some,
the moment had arrived. David Fincher’s film included numerous CGI
environments, crowd simulations, digitally created set extensions, and
matte paintings.37 Most impressively, however, fifty-two minutes of the
27. Id.
28. Bryant Frazier, Creating New Video Footage of Abraham Lincoln: How Studio Macbeth
Feb.
11,
2009,
Brought
History
to
Life
in
Maya,
FILM AND VIDEO,
http://www.studiodaily.com/filmandvideo/projects/10470.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
29. Kurtz, supra note 18, at 786.
30. Anderson, supra note 15, at 156.
31. Id.; Beard, supra note 21, at 1169.
32. Anderson, supra note 15, at 156; Beard, supra note 21, at 1169.
33. Kehr, supra note 13.
34. Id.
35. Renee Dunlop, The Curious Case of Benjamin Button: The Beginning of the End for the
Uncanny Valley.
Digital Domain Reveals Its Part in Holy Grail of VFX, CGSociety: Prod. Focus, Jan. 6, 2009,
http://features.cgsociety.org/story_custom.php?story_id=4848&page=1 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
36. Id.
37. Press Release, Oscar Winner for Best Visual Effects ‘The Curious Case of Benjamin
Button’
Shaped
with
Autodesk
Technology
(Feb.
24,
2009),
available
at
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film also featured a 100% digitally animated 3D model of Brad Pitt’s
head pasted onto the bodies of various other actors. Fincher casted petite
actors to portray Benjamin (Pitt) at various ages, but because “lighting,
continuity, and tracking issues” would have made merely compositing
photographs of Pitt’s head onto various actors impossible, Fincher hired
Digital Domain to create and composite the digital head onto these
actors’ bodies instead. 38 Digital Domain created casts of Pitt’s face and
head, as well as shoulders-up casts of the various other actors who would
embody Benjamin for much of the film. Using these casts of Pitt’s head,
an artist created maquettes of Benjamin at 60, 70, and 80 years of age.39
Digital Domain then scanned the busts, creating three-dimensional
digital meshes, and photographed Pitt in 120 different facial poses.40
Digital Domain manipulated these digital meshes to create thousands of
possible expressions in line with Pitt’s photographs and retargeted the
expressions onto the scanned Benjamin heads.41 Combining the busts
and the expressions eliminated gaps between the facial markers
employed in more traditional marker based capture.42 In effect, Digital
Domain “effectively had the three old Benjamin CGI characters
performing . . . with Brad Pitt’s full range of emotions and
expressions.”43 According to VFX Executive Producer Ed Ulbrich, “You
can put 500 markers on the face, but you still don’t get what happens
between those markers, and that was what was critically important to
us.”44 CGI’s moment may have arrived with The Curious Case of
Benjamin Button, but its arrival did more than just open eyes to the
effectiveness of CGI. It also opened the door to a whole new series of
potential legal issues.
Pitt’s participation in Benjamin Button was voluntary, and the use of
his scanned facial data may have been contractually limited to the scope
of the film. However, his facial scans—the digital meshes and 3D
models created by Digital Domain—still exist. They can be reused. This
may become yet a bigger issue in the future when the practice of bodyscanning actors becomes even more commonplace. Robert Zemeckis,
director of such films as Beowulf, The Polar Express, Back to the Future,
http://usa.autodesk.com/adsk/servlet/item?siteID=123112&id=12609262&linkID=5572947
visited March 15, 2010).
38. Dunlop, supra note 35.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Dunlop, supra note 35.
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Forrest Gump, and Cast Away, has already made digital scans of all of
the actors in his films.45 “I know some are worried about what uses will
be made of it,” Zemeckis said. “But think of what we could have—
complete digital versions of actors at various stages in their life.”46
Not everyone is on board with this idea. Tom Hanks, whose image
was scanned in during production of the Zemeckis film, The Polar
Express, has voiced concern that his “hard-fought performances can be
tampered with by after-the-fact computer amateurs, or that someone
might make unwanted use of his digital self.”47 On the other hand, Hanks
has also come to the realization that, “It’s going to happen. And I’m not
sure what actors can do about it.”48 But some, like George Lucas, who
claims to have used more digital characters than anyone else in the
industry, have stated that they have no intention of cloning an actual
human character. “It just doesn’t work,” Lucas said. “You need actors to
do that.”49 But to Steven Spielberg, ‘‘It’s a nonissue.’’50
C. Robbing the Grave and Resurrecting the Dead
Aside from cloning living humans, there have also been numerous
successful attempts to resurrect deceased personalities on the big screen,
like the appearance of Sir Lawrence Oliver in Sky Captain and the World
of Tomorrow.51 However, photorealistic cloning has not only been the
product of Hollywood; smaller studios and individual artists have also
gotten in on the action. On February 16, 2009, the History Channel aired
a two-hour documentary entitled Stealing Lincoln’s Body that featured
photorealistic virtual representations of Abraham Lincoln in a full
motion video. Ray Downing and his team at Studio Macbeth in New
York spent a whole year creating “about five minutes of faux footage” of
the dead president by scanning life masks,52 creating animatable 3D
45. Rick Lyman, Movie Stars Fear Inroads by Upstart Digital Actors, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
2001, § 1, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/08/us/movie-stars-fear-inroads-byupstart-digital-actors.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.; Beard, supra note 21, at 1218 (“Members of S.A.G. [may already] be protected to
some degree against unauthorized re-use of their existing performances,” as Professor Beard has
pointed out; “[h]owever, it should be noted the S.A.G. restrictions on re-use apply ‘only if the
performer is recognizable.’ Actor Robert Patrick's digital replica starred as liquid metal cyborg T1000 in Terminator 2: Judgment Day. The digital replica was re-used as "lunch-meat" for the digital
T-Rex in Jurassic Park. But, that scene showed only his body and limbs - not his face. He was thus
not ‘recognizable’ and the S.A.G. re-use restriction would not apply.”).
49. Lyman, supra note 45.
50. Id.
51. Anderson, supra note 15, at 156.
52. Hugh Hart, Stealing Lincoln's Body Reanimates 'Asymmetric' President, WIRED Blog,
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models of the president’s face,53 and mapping the three-dimensional
animation over the head of a live actor,54 similar to the process employed
to create Benjamin Button’s digital head. They even had an actor mimic
the particular physical characteristics reportedly exhibited by Lincoln
while walking in real life.55
The task of resurrecting Lincoln had a very personal attraction for
Downing, and the fulfillment was an achievement of special
magnitude.56 Downing and his team created the digital Lincoln in their
spare time while keeping up with their regular paying projects.57 After
completing the project, Studio Macbeth claimed to have created the “first
new images of Lincoln in 140 years.”58 Of Lincoln, Downing said, “I
never realized how much I wanted to see him walk down a street. . . until
I did.”59 However, reactions to Downing’s project have not all been
positive. One reporter said that the Studio’s work had “misplaced truth in
history and missed the line between history and art.”60
The History Channel documentary, which licensed the images from
Downing after they were already substantially complete,61 documented
the little known story of a series of grave robberies targeted at Lincoln’s
remains.62 The documentary’s title is ironically fitting. Lincoln’s body
has been stolen—cloned, resurrected, and animated in digital form. On a
whim, Downing can now insert Lincoln’s digital replica into any
imaginable situation with a few clicks of his mouse. Lincoln is not
Studio Macbeth’s last resurrection project, either. Downing has recently
reported that his next historical clone will really “make a splash.”63
Of course, these are not the art and entertainment world’s first

Feb. 13, 2009, http://blog.wired.com/underwire/2009/02/abraham-lincoln.html (last visited March
15, 2010).
53. Frazier, supra note 28.
54. Hart, supra note 52.
55. Frazier, supra note 28.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Studio Macbeth Blog Post, First New Images of Lincoln in 140 Years, July 2, 2008,
http://abrahamlincolnpictures.blogspot.com/2008/07/first-new-images-of-lincoln-in-140.html (last
visited Apr. 15, 2010).
59. Brad Brevet, Bringing Abraham Lincoln Back to Life, RopeOfSilicon.com, Feb. 12, 2009,
http://www.ropeofsilicon.com/article/bringing-abraham-lincoln-back-to-life (last visited Apr. 15,
2010).
60. Studio
Macbeth
Blog
Post,
Welcome,
July
21,
2008,
http://abrahamlincolnpictures.blogspot.com/2008/07/welcome.html (last visited March 15, 2010).
61. Frazier, supra note 28.
62. See
Stealing
Lincoln’s
Body,
History.com,
http://www.history.com/genericContent.do?id=61902 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
63. Frazier, supra note 28.
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attempts to create a photorealistic digital representation of an actual
person. In fact, it is happening all the time. Digital imaging technology
“has transformed filmed entertainment from the bottom up, removing the
assurance that what the camera sees is, was, or is remotely related to
something real. Seeing is no longer believing, even to the tiny degree it
once was.”64 And of course, the cloning of actual people is not the only
sort of digital replication that is occurring at a rapid pace. Products,
automobiles, buildings, and entire cities are also being scanned or
modeled in photorealistic clarity, and many consumers are all too happy
to accept what they see as real.
Digital clones have come a long way since the “liquid metal cyborg
in Terminator 2: Judgment Day”65 and the thousands of digital extras
that populated films like Titanic, Lord of the Rings, Gladiator,66 and
Pearl Harbor.67 Merely compositing footage to, for example, allow Tom
Hanks to meet Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon68 has become
old news. Perhaps the future contains a line of new John Wayne
westerns,69 or perhaps “Marilyn Monroe and Russell Crowe could costar in a new film.”70 These possibilities raise a variety of fascinating
legal concerns, including violations of the right of publicity, however this
Article focuses predominantly on whether copyright or sui generis
database laws should protect the digital artist’s creation embodying
realistic depictions of real people—the basic digital model itself.
One of the biggest obstacles to photorealistic animation is the artistic
and technical limitations to the objective itself, especially when motion is
involved. In The Curious Case of Benjamin Button, for example,
animators had to go beyond traditional tracking techniques to attach the
digital head to the neck and spine of various actors despite moving
cameras and lens distortion.71 These obstacles are dissipating at a
dramatic rate, however, as technology improves. On the other hand,
some new legal obstacles facing digital artists are only just beginning to
64. Kehr, supra note 13.
65. See Beard, supra note 21, at 1169.
66. Kurtz, supra note 18, at 784 n.5 (“In 1997, digital passengers populated the deck of the
Titanic in the Academy Award film, Titanic.” (citing Carolyn Giardina, Digital Human Creation
Advances, Backstage, Nov. 26, 2004, at 4, available at 2004 WLNR 15829593) (“Digital extras
provided a cast of thousands in King Arthur, Gladiator, and Lord of the Rings.” (citing Here's
Looking at a Digitally Generated Kid, Sunday Bus., Oct. 3, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR
7425572))).
67. Beard, supra note 21, at 1169.
68. Id. at 1206; Anderson, supra note 15, at 156.
69. Kurtz, supra note 18, at 785.
70. Id.
71. Dunlop, supra note 35.
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become apparent. For example, copyright law’s requirement of
originality and the lack of sui generis database protection in the United
States may present artists with additional need to protect their digital data
through technology and contract. Digitally recreating reality may also
make an unwitting digital artist liable for violation of copyright, patent,
trademark, and right of publicity laws.
D. User-Generated Content: A Small Glimpse into the Future
As digital modeling technology has begun to see rapid growth in
user-generated content over the internet, some have commented that new
technology has invited the great cloning debate into filmmaking. “It is
the old Frankenstein scenario, played out in the most modern terms.
Perhaps we will be able to bring back Cary Grant or Marilyn Monroe,
but, like the mad doctor’s stitched-together monster, they probably won’t
seem quite like their old selves.”72 Potentially, dead actors may work
again and living actors might be employed to do things they never knew
they did.73 Indeed, a celebrity’s virtual head may have already become a
commodity on the internet. A preliminary search of the internet revealed
digital models of Barack Obama, John McCain, Angelina Jolie, David
Beckham, Jack Nicholson, Jessica Alba, Kevin Spacey, Sharon Stone,
Albert Einstein, Abraham Lincoln, and Brad Pitt for sale online at prices
ranging from $19 to $200 each.74 The majority of these models do not
come close to the likes of Digital Domain’s photorealistic Benjamin
Button, but most were probably created by individual artists in their
basements and bedrooms, as opposed to established visual effects firms
with Hollywood budgets. These artists are perhaps just hoping to make a
few extra bucks and gain recognition in their own online communities by
selling their own user-generated content online.
Perhaps soon the masses will control the grail.
III. COPYRIGHT: THE REQUIREMENT OF ORIGINALITY
A.Originality in the United States
In the United States, copyright protects “original works of authorship

72. Kehr, supra note 13.
73. Id.
74. See
VIP
and
Celebrities
People
3D
Models,
FlatPyramid.com,
http://flatpyramid.com/shopdisplayproducts.asp?catnameid=99&catname=VIP%20and%20Celebriti
es&id=0&maincategoryid=1&subcatid=4 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
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fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”75 The constitution of the
United States mandates that works must exhibit some degree of
originality before copyright protection will adhere to them.76 The
Supreme Court has made it clear on multiple occasions that the terms
“authors” and “writings” “presuppose [this] degree of originality.”77
Despite this low bar, copyright does not protect facts or ideas, only
expression.78 Oddly enough, the destiny of the digital model might be
dictated by the fate of an ordinary phonebook in the United States
Supreme Court.79
In the landmark Supreme Court decision, Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., Justice O’Connor declared, “The sine qua non of
copyright is originality.”80 Despite its supreme and long-recognized
importance to copyright law however, federal courts have not been
consistent in interpreting exactly what originality required. The Second,
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits historically adhered to a “creative
selection” theory that rewarded creativity,81 while others circuits have
granted protection for labor, skill, and investment on “sweat of the brow”
principles.82 These two lines of cases present the two principal
justifications for providing copyright protection in the first instance; as a
reward for effort and investment, or as a reward for creativity and
allowing the public access to creative works.83 The Feist decision,
however, “dropped a bomb” on the country’s copyright jurisprudence
when it espoused the former viewpoint.84 The Court held that some
threshold amount of material must be “independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works)”85 and that the work
must possess “at least some minimal degree of creativity.”86 The Court
held, quite clearly, that creativity is the only valid basis for granting
75. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2008).
76. Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
77. Id.; Trade-Mark cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111
U.S. 53, 53 (1884).
78. Feist, 499 U.S. at 350.
79. Id. at 340; see Meshwerks Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 528 F.3d 1258, 1258 (10th
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1006 (2009).
80. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
81. Daniel J. Gervais, The Protection of Databases, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109, 1133 (2007).
82. Feist, 499 U.S. at 352.
83. Gervais, supra note 81, at 1134.
84. See id. at 1133 (citing Jane C. Ginsburg, Statement on H.R. 2652: The Collections of
Information
Antipiracy
Act
(Oct.
28,
1997),
available
at
http://www.hyperlaw.com//topix/database/ginsburg.htm (attributing the quote to the Register of
Copyrights at the time the Feist decision was announced) (last visited March 15, 2010)).
85. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
86. Id.
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copyright protection.87 The required creativity is decidedly low,88 and
the “vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess
some creative spark.”89 However, this definition of originality precludes
some factually based work from copyright protection, including, as we
shall see, digital models of real life objects and the telephone directory at
issue in the Feist case itself.90
In the 1880 Supreme Court case Baker v. Selden,91 the Court held
that bookkeeping forms, designed to illustrate a system of bookkeeping
and “consisting of ruled lines and blank columns,”92 did not meet the
required standard of originality.93 In that case, the Court found a
distinction between the book itself and the system the forms illustrated—
only the former was the proper subject of copyright.94 In Feist, the court
analogized the plaintiff’s telephone books to the forms in Baker, and held
that copyright would not protect the listings in the telephone directory
because the information was purely factual, arranged in alphabetical
order, and did not “possess more than a de minimis quantum of
creativity.”95
Even after Feist, expression might be found in some creative
arrangement of otherwise unprotected material.96 The Feist decision,
87. Gervais, supra note 81, at 1134.
88. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
89. Id.
90. See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004); BellSouth Adver. &
Publ’g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993); Sem-Torq, Inc. v.
Kmart Corp., 936 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991); Victor Lalli Enters., Inc., v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936
F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991); Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 867 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ill. 1994), aff’d, 59 F.3d
719 (7th Cir. 1995). In some post-Feist cases, however, federal appellate courts have upheld
copyrights in factual compilations. See Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d
640 (7th Cir. 2003); TransWestern Publ’g Co. LP v. Multimedia Mktg. Assocs., Inc., 133 F.3d 773
(10th Cir. 1998); Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995); Warren Publ’g, Inc. v. Microdos
Data Corp., 52 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1995), vacated, 67 F.3d 276 (11th Cir. 1995) (granting rehearing
en banc); CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1994);
Key Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991); Kregos v.
Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991); U.S. Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited of
Durham, Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2049 (4th Cir. 1991).
91. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
92. Id. at 101.
93. Id. at 107 (“[T]he mere copyright of Selden's book did not confer upon him the exclusive
right to make and use account books, ruled and arranged as designated by him and described and
illustrated in said book.”)
94. Id. at 104 (“The use of the art is a totally different thing from a publication of the book
explaining it. The copyright of a book on book-keeping cannot secure the exclusive right to make,
sell, and use account books prepared upon the plan set forth in such book.”)
95. Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
96. Id. at 345 (“The compilation author typically chooses which facts to include, in what
order to place them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used effectively by
readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by
the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may
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however, explicitly overruled the idea that hard work and industrious
labor alone would merit copyright protection.97 This doctrine,
alternatively labeled “sweat of the brow” or “industrious collection,” had
been circulating through a number of lower courts for years by the time
Feist was decided.98 These lower courts adhered to the “sweat of the
brow” doctrine based on a line of authority that led all the way back to
the English cases Kelly v. Morris and Morris v. Ashby from the 1860s.99
A classic example of this doctrine, discussed in the Feist decision, stated
that:
[t]he right to copyright a book upon which one has
expended labor in its preparation does not depend upon
whether the materials which he has collected consist or
not of matters which are publici juris, or whether such
materials show literary skill or originality, either in
thought or in language, or anything more than
industrious collection. The man who goes through the
streets of a town and puts down the names of each of the
inhabitants, with their occupations and their street

protect such compilations through the copyright laws.”) (citing 1-2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§
2.11[D], 3.03 (2008))).
97. Feist, 499 U.S. at 352.
98. Id.
99. Telstra Corp. Ltd. v Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd., [2001] FCA 612, ¶ 68, appeal dismissed
by Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd., v. Telstra Corp. Ltd., [2002] FCAFC 112, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ct/2001/612.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
In Kelly v. Morris, 1 Eq 697 (1866), the plaintiff claimed copyright in a street directory. Sir Wood
VC said:
. . . a subsequent compiler is bound to set about doing for himself that which
the first compiler has done. In case of a road-book, he must count the
milestones for himself . . . generally, he is not entitled to take one word of the
information previously published without independently working out the
matter for himself, so as to arrive at the same result from the same common
sources of information, and the only use he can legitimately make of a
previous publication is to verify his own calculations and results when
obtained.” Id. at 701–02.
In Morris v. Ashbee, 7 Eq 34 (1868), the defendant in the earlier case, claimed copyright in his trade
directory comprised of an alphabetical list of names and occupations of merchants and traders
carrying on business in London. Giffard VC said:
The Plaintiff incurred the labour and expense first of getting the necessary
information for the arrangement and compilation of the names as they stood in
his directory, and then of making the actual compilation and arrangement . . . .
[I]n a case such as this no one has a right to take the results of the labour and
expense incurred by another for the purposes of a rival publication, and
thereby save himself the expense and labour of working out and arriving at
these results by some independent road. If this was not so, there would be
practically no copyright in such a work as a directory. Id. at 40–41.
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number, acquires material of which he is the author.100
In one earlier district court case, Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger,101
the court upheld a sculptor’s copyright in his miniaturized duplication of
Rodin’s “Hand of God” sculpture. 102 Although not explicitly relying on
the “sweat of the brow” doctrine, the court’s reasoning reflected similar
concerns. Despite the fact that the plaintiff claimed his reproduction was
designed “to duplicate as closely as possible the exact shape, patina,
color and texture of the original,”103 the court found creative expression
and originality in the “skill and originality” required to produce “an
accurate scale reproduction.”104 In particular, the court found that “it
takes “‘an extremely skilled sculptor’ many hours”105 to “produce a scale
reduction of a great work with exactitude.”106 The combination of a
slight difference in the base of the reproduction (the rear of the plaintiff’s
base was closed, Rodin’s was open) “when coupled with the skilled
scaled sculpture is itself creative.”107
If not for the reasoning in later cases, despite their reluctance to
overrule it, the Alva case might have provided an argument that digital
models of actual objects are original, especially when the artist expended
great effort to reproduce them on a much smaller scale. L. Batlin & Son,
Inc. v. Snyder,108 a Second Circuit case of more recent vintage, though
still pre-Feist, held that a mere change in medium was not enough to
confer the requisite creativity.109 Sitting en banc, the court said that
“there must be at least some substantial variation, not merely a trivial
variation such as might occur in the translation to a different
medium.”110 In Batlin, the appellant had copied a public domain Uncle
Sam bank and translated the design from cast iron to plastic. Because
various elements would “not reproduce well in plastic on a smaller size,”
appellants deviated from the exact design of the original bank, changing
100. Feist, 499 U.S. at 352–53 (quoting Jeweler's Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co.,
281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922)).
101. Alva Studios, Inc., v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
102. See id.
103. Id. at 266.
104. Id. at 267.
105. Id. at 266.
106. Id. at 267.
107. Id.
108. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 857 (1976).
109. The court quoted Professor Nimmer and held that “the mere reproduction of a work of art
in a different medium should not constitute the required originality . . . .” Id. at 491.
110. Id.
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the size of the bank and its base, the texture and shape and positioning of
various elements, and changed arrows grasped in the eagle’s talons into
leaves.111 The court concluded that the variations in the appellant’s bank
were “trivial” because “the [plastic] bank is extremely similar to the cast
iron bank, save in size and material.”112 The court found that the many
similarities were more important than the differences, and held the bank
not copyrightable.113
Despite its holding, the en banc Second Circuit declined to overrule
Alva or, apparently, the implicit “sweat of the brow” rewarded in that
case, because “[t]he complexity and exactitude” involved in reproducing
the Rodin sculpture was the product of “an extremely skilled sculptor”
while the appellant’s bank was nothing more than a “‘knock-off’
reproduction.”114 Despite the confusing lack of consistency among the
circuit courts prior to 1991, Feist has presumably cleared up any
confusion these cases might have provided about the vitality of the
“sweat of the brow” doctrine in the United States.
However, to properly assess the copyrightability of digital clones
against this backdrop of evolving originality jurisprudence, it is
important to first understand a few of the creative and technical
processes involved in creating these digital models.
i. The cloning process
There are essentially two general approaches to digitally cloning an
individual or another object: a direct approach and an indirect
approach.115 This Article will provide only a brief overview of these
complex and rapidly evolving processes to provide the foundation
required to analyze the resulting digital data in the context of copyright
and database law.
The direct approach involves using laser scanners or other types of

111. Id. at 489 (changes noted by the court included “the carpetbag shape of the plastic bank is
smooth, the iron bank rough; the metal bank bag is fatter at its base; the eagle on the front of the
platform in the metal bank is holding arrows in his talons while in the plastic bank he clutches leaves
. . . [t]he shape of Uncle Sam's face is supposedly different, as is the shape and texture of the hats . . .
[i]n the metal version the umbrella is hanging loose while in the plastic item it is included in the
single mold. The texture of the clothing, the hairline, shape of the bow ties and of the shirt collar and
left arm as well as the flag carrying the name on the base of the statute are all claimed to be different,
along with the shape and texture of the eagles on the side.”).
112. Id. (internal citations omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 491–92.
115. This definition is attributed to Professor Joseph Beard, who discussed the process of
creating digital clones in some detail. See Beard, supra note 21, at 1172–90.
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digital recording devices to capture the geometry of the object.116 This
includes motion or performance capture, like that used in films such as
The Polar Express, where the studio records an actor’s movements by
digitally tracking various points on the actor.117 The indirect approach,
utilized to create the models for Digital Domain’s Benjamin Button and
Studio Macbeth’s Abraham Lincoln, involves the use of life masks,
busts, photographs, and other reference material to model a realistic
clone.118 In either case, the process results in a digital mesh that can be
edited and manipulated in 3-D modeling software, such as Autodesk
Maya or even free open source software such as Blender, to create an
animatable model. These models, somewhat like a phone directory, exist
as collections of data representing factual information. These data points
can be expressed onscreen in modeling software as small dots placed at
corresponding X-, Y-, and Z-axes, and each individual data point can be
manipulated independently. The model itself can be animated, colored,
textured, and rendered with a few clicks of a mouse.
In the context of digital cloning, or digitally replicating other preexisting material, the requirement of originality presents a pressing
question: Do these three-dimensional models exhibit the “spark of
creativity” required by Feist? If the digital data is sufficiently original, it
would be copyrightable.119 As Professor Leslie Kurtz pointed out,
“Digital actors are created by combining elements of human beings and
elements created by human beings. Only the latter are protected by
copyright. Copyright . . . will not protect a person’s voice and image.”120
On the other hand, the late Professor Joseph Beard believed that scanned
data might exhibit the required originality to be copyrightable.121
Professor Beard, however, was only cautiously optimistic.122 He felt that
digitally sculpted models created independently of scanned data should
be copyrightable, as essentially involving the same creativity as
traditional sculptures.123 It was not until 2008 that a federal appellate
court finally weighed in on the matter.124 However, the principal case
discussed below, still leaves some of these questions unanswered.
116. Id. at 1172–73. This process was used to create the models at issue in Meshwerks,
discussed infra.
117. Kurtz, supra note 18, at 786.
118. Beard, supra note 21, at 1186–90.
119. Id. at 1177.
120. Kurtz, supra note 18, at 791 (emphasis added).
121. Beard, supra note 21, at 1177.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 1188.
124. See Meshwerks v. Toyota, 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008).
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ii. Meshwerks v. Toyota: Originality and digital models
In 2008, the Tenth Circuit applied these long-standing rules of
originality to digital models of real objects; in this case, Toyota
automobiles.125 Concerning the requirement of independent creation, the
Meshwerks court asked “how might that doctrine apply in an age of
virtual worlds and digital media that seek to mimic the ‘real’ world, but
often do so in ways that undoubtedly qualify as (highly) original?”126 In
many ways, copyright law’s treatment of photography is telling and
relevant to the issue of digitally cloning the real world, as the Meshwerks
court recognized. The court stated, “[w]hile there is little authority
explaining how our received principles of copyright law apply to the
relatively new digital medium before us, some lessons may be discerned
from how the law coped in an earlier time with a previous revolution in
technology: photography.”127
Fortunately, this previous technological revolution is one area of
copyright where the United States has been at the forefront. Despite
Herman Melville’s declaration that “[i]t is better to fail in originality than
to succeed in imitation,”128 the fact that a copyright may be obtained in a
photorealistic imitation of reality has been clear since Napoleon Sarony’s
photographs of Oscar Wilde were found copyrightable in 1884.129
Despite arguments that a photograph merely “copies everything and
explains nothing”130 (the copies, of course, are unprotected by
copyright), the Burrow-Giles Court welcomed photographs as “fullfledged members of the copyright genus.”131 Photography was included
as copyrightable subject matter in the 1909 Copyright Act.132 Under the
1976 Copyright Act, section 102(a)(5)’s classification of “pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works” (PGS works), copyright “explicitly
extends to photographs.”133 Digital artists engaged in recreating reality
would be wise, however, to fully understand what exactly copyright
does, and does not, protect—even in a photograph.
Current copyright law in relation to photographs establishes specific

125. Id. at 1260.
126. Id. at 1263.
127. Id.
128. Hershel Parker, HERMAN MELVILLE: A BIOGRAPHY 759 (Illus. ed., 2005).
129. See generally Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 53 (1884).
130. SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 307 (S.D.N.Y 2000)
(internal quotation omitted).
131. 1-2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08 (2008).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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guidelines for determining when copyright protections apply. In BurrowGiles, the Supreme Court recognized that a photographer was an author,
and exhibited the requisite creativity, by virtue of “posing [the
subject] . . . , selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other
various accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to
present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade,
suggesting and evoking the desired expression . . . .”134 These are the
elements of the photograph protected by copyright, and Sarony had no
claim to the depiction of Wilde himself because “Wilde’s inimitable
visage does not belong, or ‘owe its origins’ to any photographer.”135
Others could photograph or otherwise reproduce Wilde as they wished,
as long as they did not copy the protected elements from Sarony’s
photos. If another individual independently created those elements (for
example, someone with no prior experience with Sarony’s work), Sarony
would have no infringement claim and the subsequent author would
acquire protection for the expressive elements in his or her own work.
Likewise, in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic, the Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff’s works, chromolithographs created to advertise a
circus, were copyrightable even though they represented objects from
real life.136 “Others are free to copy the original,” the Court opined.
“They are not free to copy the copy.”137
In Meshwerks, the models at issue were “unadorned, digital wireframes of Toyota’s vehicles.”138 The models formed the basic
components of “computerized substitutes for product photographs” for
Toyota to use on its website and in advertisements.139 The models
allowed Toyota’s advertising agency to avoid the hassle of multiple
photography shoots because, with the click of a mouse, “the advertiser
can change the color of the car, its surroundings, and even edit its
physical dimensions to portray changes in vehicle styling.”140
Meshwerks created these digital models by taking copious measurements
of Toyota’s vehicles by covering each car, truck, and van with a grid of
tape and running an articulated arm tethered to a computer over the
134. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 55.
135. Meshwerks v. Toyota, 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at
59); see also 1-3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.03[C][3] (2008) (“As applied to a photograph of a preexisting product, that bedrock principle [of originality] means that the photographer manifestly
cannot claim to have originated the matter depicted therein . . . .”).
136. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903) (“[E]ven if they had
been drawn from the life, that fact would not deprive them of protection.”).
137. Id.
138. Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1260.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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vehicle to measure all points of intersection in the grid. Based on these
measurements, modeling software generated a digital image resembling a
wire-frame model. In other words, the vehicles’ data points
(measurements) were mapped onto a computerized grid and the
modeling software connected the dots to create a “wire frame” of each
vehicle.141
Meshwerks’s employees, using the scanned data as reference, then
“fine-tuned” or “sculpted” the models by manipulating approximately
ninety percent of the individual data points to more accurately and
realistically resemble the defendant’s vehicles.142 Because some aspects
of the models (e.g., wheels, headlights, door handles, and emblems)
“could not be accurately measured using current technology,”
Meshwerks’s employees added these features manually by referring to
photographs.143 They spent between 80–100 hours completing this
second “sculpting” stage. After Meshwerks completed the basic models,
Toyota’s advertising agency sent the models elsewhere for “color,
texture, lighting, and animation.”144
Toyota made use of the finished products in its advertising
campaigns. Meshwerks filed suit because it objected to various
subsequent uses of the models, including the fact that Toyota’s
advertising agency sent one of Meshwerks’s wireframe models to one of
Meshwerks’s direct competitors.145 Consequently, they sued Toyota for
copyright infringement. In 2008, the Tenth Circuit held that
Meshwerks’s digital wire-frame models of Toyota vehicles were not
original and were not entitled to copyright protection, despite the
substantial amount of effort involved in manually sculpting the models.
The court affirmed summary judgment for Toyota while quoting from
Feist: “[C]opyright assures authors the right to their original expression,
but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information
conveyed by a work.”146 Implicitly, this meant Meshwerks’s competitors
earned a free ride in Meshwerks’s model cars because the models alone
did not contain creative elements of expression, such as camera and lens
choice, lighting, color, and environment. Essentially, they were just the
raw data based on preexisting design that allowed Toyota to later create
copyrightable images.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
(1991)).

Id.
Id. at 1260–61.
Id.
Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1258.
Id. at 1261 n.1.
Id. at 1262–63 (quoting Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 340
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Thus, without implementing creative elements of independent
expression, it is unlikely there will be copyright protection. For example,
in Meshwerks, the court affirmed summary judgment against the
modeling company, and held that “the uncontested facts reveal that
Meshwerks’s models owe their designs and origins to Toyota and
deliberately do not include anything original of their own.”147 In short,
they were “merely copies of Toyota’s products.”148 This holding would
seem to apply equally to models of cars as well as models of human
beings or buildings, and the fact that Meshwerks’s goal was to replicate
Toyota’s vehicles as closely as possible only bolstered the court’s
reasoning.149 The Meshwerks decision indicates that even those models
created, at least partially, by digital sculpting techniques, rather than by
scanning devices like those used in the case, would not be protected by
virtue of the artist’s intent to replicate the original with fidelity.
Importantly, the court’s analysis also compared the models to other PGS
works, including photographs150 and sketches of automobile parts,151
and did not discuss potential database protection for the scanned
automobile data. This apparent lack of protection has serious
consequences for companies like Meshwerks, who are involved in
digitizing and modeling objects on a regular basis.152
Although Meshwerks provides guidance as to what form of
expression qualifies for copyright protection in the digital context, some
questions inexorably remain. The Meshwerks court discussed the
copyrightability of models after subsequent modeling companies had
introduced color, lighting, and texture.153 The court also found a direct
connection between photographs of Oscar Wilde and models of Toyota
cars such that,
the facts in this case unambiguously show that Meshwerks did

147. Id. at 1260.
148. Id. at 1261.
149. Id. at 1260.
150. Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1263–64 (citing SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F.
Supp. 2d 301, 307 (S.D.N.Y 2000); see also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53,
59 (1884)).
151. Id. at 1269 (citing ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts,
Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 712 (6th Cir. 2005)).
152. The services portion of Meshwerks’s website states that “Meshwerks routinely digitizes
objects of all types and sizes, from the very small and ornate, to full-sized automobiles and beyond.
Our highly accurate measuring systems are portable, allowing for on-site data acquisition almost
anywhere.” See Meshwerks, http://www.meshwerks.com (click on “services”) (last visited Apr. 15,
2010).
153. Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1266 n.8.
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not make any decisions regarding lighting, shading, the
background in front of which a vehicle would be posed, the
angle at which to pose it, or the like – in short, its models reflect
none of the decisions that can make depictions of things or facts
in the world, whether Oscar Wilde or a Toyota Camry, new
expressions subject to copyright protection.154
The Meshwerks holding reflects the intent of Feist. However, the
application of these long held rules eschewing the “sweat of the brow” to
the circumstances in Meshwerks presents a significant hurdle to those
who create these types of digital wire-frame models, including those of
human clones and commercial products, which parties will need to
address by contract. This is especially true since protection for databases
in the United States is currently limited to the creative arrangement of
information under copyright and no sui generis database protection
exists, unlike in the European Union.155 After all, the model itself is not
subject to creative elements such as camera angle and lighting, it exists
solely as a set of data points—an empty mesh. These creative elements
are necessarily the province of the actual renderings of the model which,
like the expressive elements of a photograph, are the proper subject
matter of copyright, whether as PGS or audiovisual works.
B. Originality and Industrious Collection Elsewhere: A Look at the
Law in the United Kingdom and Australia
Copyright laws in both the United States and Australia came into
existence against the backdrop of England’s original copyright act, the
Statute of Anne, in 1710.156 The current standard of originality in the
United States, however, bears little resemblance to the present day
standards in the United Kingdom and Australia.157 Contrary to the
position in the United States after Feist, both U.K. and Australian courts
have continued granting copyright protection to works based on
154. Id. at 1265.
155. See Beard, supra note 21 at 1178–80.
156. See Cristin Fenzel, Note, Still Life with "Spark" And "Sweat": The Copyrightability of
Contemporary Art in the United States and the United Kingdom, 24 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 541,
557 (2007); Telstra Corp. Ltd., v Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd., [2001] FCA 612, ¶ 85.
157. Except perhaps when it comes to database protection, where the originality standards of
these countries—as well as Canada, the UK, and Ireland—have arguably been converging. See
Bryce Newell, Out with the Old and in with the New: Converging Standards of Originality for
Database Protection (unpublished), available at https://lawlib.wlu.edu/works/374-1.pdf, (last visited
Apr. 15, 2010); see also the comparative discussion of originality in Telstra Corp. Ltd., v Desktop
Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd., [2001] FCA 612, and Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd., [2005] EWCA 565,
¶¶ 28–36 (appeal taken from England).
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industrious collection and “sweat of the brow” principles.158 In a recent
Australian case applying copyright originality standards to a factual
compilation, Telstra Corp. Ltd., v. Desktop Marketing Systems Pty.
Ltd.,159 the Australian Federal Court confronted facts similar to those in
Feist. In Telstra, however, the court declined to follow Feist’s line of
reasoning, and held that the telephone directories were original—thus
copyrightable.160 In Telstra, the plaintiff had created a number of white
and yellow page telephone directories161 and claimed that the defendants
had infringed its copyrights.162 The court examined British and
American case law,163 including the Feist decision, and held that the
plaintiff’s directories were copyrightable as a whole,164 explicitly
rejecting the Feist rationale requiring a “spark of creativity”165 in favor
of a “labour and expense” test. Because “Telstra had undertaken
substantial labour and incurred substantial expense” in compiling and
presenting the information in its directory, the directories were worthy of
copyright protection.166 For a time, the Telstra decision appeared to
reflect the generally accepted originality standard in Australia. However,
in 2009, the Australian High Court indicated that the Telstra decision
should be read with some caution. In IceTV v. Nine Network
Australia,167 two concurring judgments of three judges each both
disapproved of the analysis set out in the previous case, although it was
ruling on a different issue.168 These judgments considered the proper test
of originality to be the skill and effort directed at a particular form of
expression rather than just a broad inquiry into expense and labor
extended.169 The language in the judgment, however, is restricted to the
context of compilations, and may reflect a change in standard applicable
only to factual compilations.
Recent decisions in England have confirmed the vitality of rewarding
diligent effort with copyright protection. In 2005, the English Court of
Appeal was confronted with a dispute over the copyrightability of
158. Id.
159. Telstra Corp., [2001] FCA at 612.
160. See id. ¶ 90.
161. Id. ¶ 1.
162. Id. ¶ 7.
163. Id. ¶¶ 50–85.
164. Id. ¶ 90.
165. Telstra Corp. Ltd., v Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd., [2001] FCA 612, ¶ 85.
166. IceTV Pty. Ltd. v Nine Network Austl. Pty. Ltd., [2009] HCA 14, ¶ 133 (Judgment of
Gummow J, Hayne J, Heydon J).
167. Id. at 14.
168. Id.¶¶ 52, 134, 187–88.
169. See id. ¶ 52.
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modern performing editions of public domain musical works in Sawkins
v. Hyperion Records, Ltd.170 The court discussed the present state of the
“sweat of the brow” doctrine and held:
Reproductions requiring great talent and technical skill
may qualify as protectable works of authorship, even if
they are copies of pre-existing works. . . .” In the end
the question is one of degree: how much skill, labour
and judgment in the making of the copy is that of the
creator of that copy? Both individual creative input and
sweat of brow may be involved and will be factors in the
overall evaluation.171
In that case, Dr. Lionel Sawkins had composed and recorded modern
performances of music by Michel-Richard de Lalande, court composer
for Louis XIV and Louis XV.172 In the suit, Dr. Sawkins claimed that his
modern editions were original and that the defendant music publishing
company had infringed his rights by refusing to pay royalties after
distributing Sawkins’s sound recordings on CD.173 Sawkins spent
approximately 300 hours to create the works at issue.174 His
contributions included adding bass lines,175 re-creating missing viola
parts,176 and modifying over 1000 notes to make the music playable.177
In that case, Lord Justice Mummery concluded that “the effort, skill and
time . . . spent in making the three performing editions” satisfied the
originality requirement of copyright, “even though (a) Dr Sawkins
worked on the scores of existing musical works composed by another
person (Lalande); (b) Lalande’s works are out of copyright; and (c) Dr
Sawkins had no intention of adding any new notes of music of his
own.”178 The other two justices on the panel agreed.179
The Sawkins decision came after the implementation of Britain’s
current copyright statute, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act

170. Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd., [2005] EWCA 565, ¶ 1.
171. Id. ¶ 83 (quoting Prof. Jane Ginsberg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative
Copyright Law, available at http://ssrn.com.abstract_id=368481 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010)).
172. Id. ¶ 1.
173. Id. ¶¶ 4, 11.
174. Id. ¶ 9.
175. Id. ¶ 8(1).
176. Sawkins v. Hyperion Records Ltd., [2005] EWCA 565, ¶ 8(2).
177. Id. ¶¶ 8(1), 8(3).
178. Id. ¶ 36 (emphasis added).
179. See id. ¶ 71 (judgment of Mance LJ) & ¶¶ 85–86 (judgment of Jacob LJ).
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(CDPA) of 1988. Its holding was based on an interpretation of originality
that existed in case law long before the word “original” ever appeared in
a British copyright statute.180 The CPDA states that “Copyright is a
property right which subsists . . . in the following descriptions of work—
original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works.”181 The word
“original” first appeared in the Copyright Act of 1911.182 The current
definition of “work”—as fleshed out by the British courts—”is closely
linked to the definition of ‘original.’”183
This alternate approach to originality and the “sweat of the brow” or
industrious collection doctrine has a long and rich history in English and
Australian law. Prior to England’s Copyright Act of 1911 (which
Australia adopted in 1912),184 the English courts had already begun to
recognize that compilations were “of a different character” than works of
art or literature, and that “the originality requirement for a compilation
could not be the same as for other works.”185 British courts recognized
copyrights in court calendars,186 a “dry list of names” in a chemist’s
alphabetically arranged stock list,187 street directories,188 trade
directories,189 and, in the landmark case of Walter v. Lane,190 a
reporter’s written record of a public speech.191
The Telstra court concluded, after reviewing these older English
cases, that these decisions stood for the proposition that “copyright
protection could be claimed by a person who brought out a directory in
consequence of an expensive, complicated and well organised venture,
even if there was no creativity in the selection or arrangement of the
180. Fenzel, supra note 157, at 569.
181. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 1(1) (U.K.) [hereinafter CDPA]:
Copyright is a property right which subsists in accordance with this Part in the following
descriptions of work—
(a) original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works,
(b) sound recordings, films, broadcasts or cable programs, and
(c) the typographical arrangement of published editions. Id.
The Act defines “artistic work” as: (a) a graphic work, photograph, sculpture or collage, irrespective
of artistic quality, (b) a work of architecture being a building or a model for a building, or (c) a work
of artistic craftsmanship. Id. § 4(1).
182. Fenzel, supra note 157, at 569.
183. Id. at 569.
184. Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd., [2001] FCA 612, ¶ 85.
185. Id. ¶ 84.
186. Id. ¶ 51 (quoting Matthewson v. Stockdale, (1806) 12 Ves. 270; 33 ER 103, 105–06).
187. Id. ¶ 49 (citing Collis v. Cater, Stoffell and Fortt Ltd., (1898) 78 LT (NS) 613 (1898)).
188. Id. ¶ 52 (quoting Kelly v. Morris, (1866) 1 Eq 697, 701-02 (1866)).
189. Telstra Corp., [2001] FCA at 612, ¶ 53 (quoting Morris v. Ashbee 7 Eq 34, 40–41
(1868)).
190. Walter v. Lane, [1900] AC 539 (Eng.).
191. Telstra Corp., [2001] FCA at 612, ¶ 56 (citing Walter AC 539, 546–58).
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data.192 Thus, these cases held that intellectual effort is not required to
obtain copyright, only “sufficient work involved and expense incurred in
gathering the facts or other data.193
English case law after the Copyright Act of 1911 has rarely denied
copyright to compilations of data, yet decisions have been somewhat
unpredictable.194 For example, in one case, a railway timetable’s index,
updated monthly, was copyrightable.195 In another, it was not.196 The
difference appears to be the result of the different amount of labor and
expense invested by the respective plaintiffs.197 Summing up the last
century or so of British case law on the subject, the Telstra court
concluded, “[c]opyright will subsist if there has been sufficient
intellectual effort in the selection or arrangement of the facts. It will also
subsist if the author has engaged in sufficient work or incurred sufficient
expense in gathering the facts.”198 The Sawkins decision appears to
validate this conclusion.
There have been some cases, however, that demonstrate that even
English “sweat of the brow” principles will not always protect copies of
existing works (photographs in particular) or other items. In the English
High Court case of Antiquesportfolio.com v. Rodney Fitch & Co.,199
Neuberger J. (quoting Nimmer on Copyright) stated that in cases of
slavish copying, such as photographing another photograph or twodimensional work of art or recreating exactly a prior scene and taking
another photograph in an effort to copy the first, no originality could be
found under English law. The court also quoted from a U.S. case,
Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel,200 which applied U.K. law and denied
copyright in such a photograph due to lack of originality.201 On the other
hand, “if the photographer in such a case could show that he had in fact
used some degree of skill and care in taking the photograph,” he might
be able to claim copyright.202 In AntiquesPortfolio.com, the Judge found
that simple catalog photographs of “individual antiques such as items of
furniture, glassware, metal-work, sculpture and the like”203 exhibited the
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. ¶ 84 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶ 50.
Id. ¶ 62.
Id. ¶ 61 (citing H. Blacklock & Co. Ltd., v. C. Arthur Pearson Ltd., [1915] 2 Ch 376).
Id. ¶ 62 (citing Leslie v. J. Young & Sons., [1894] AC 335).
Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty. Ltd., [2001] FCA 612¶ 61–62.
Id. ¶ 64 (emphasis added).
Antiquesportfolio.com v Rodney Fitch & Co., [2001] E.C.D.R. 5 (2000).
Bridgeman Art Library Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (1998).
Id. at 426–28.
AntiquesPortfolio.com, [2001] E.C.D.R. 5, ¶ 33.
Id. ¶ 13.

119

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 6

required originality204 because “[i]n the case of photographs of a threedimensional object . . . the positioning of the object (unless it is a
sphere), the angle at which it is taken, the lighting and the focus, and
matters such as that, could all be matters of aesthetic or even commercial
judgment.”205 The court continued to justify its holding by stating that
“some degree of skill was [also] involved in the lighting, angling and
judging the positioning” of the objects.206
The explicit rejection of Feist by the Australian and English courts
would appear to allow copyright protection for the models in a case like
Meshwerks as long as the creation of the models involved a significant
investment of time, skill, and effort. Arguably, the hours of “digital
sculpting” and modeling of certain additional portions of the overall
models in that case would have survived attack under the industrious
collection standard in these jurisdictions. However, part of the problem
of analyzing protection for digital models, at least in their basic
subsistence as editable wire-frame meshes, is figuring out where they
ought to fit within the various subject matter of copyright, or whether
they might more properly fit under a distinct database protection regime.
If the artistic or PGS works categories are appropriate, as the United
States Tenth Circuit appears to have assumed, they will be subject in the
United States to the same requirements of originality as for other PGS or
artistic copyright works of art after Feist. In this situation, U.S. law
appears to grant less protection potentially than do “sweat of the brow”
regimes like the U.K. or Australia. However, if the digital models were
considered databases (which they might properly be, as digital
compilations of numerous X, Y, and Z coordinates and related
information), the current state of database protection in the European
Union might not actually provide any greater protection than would
copyright law in the United States.207 Potentially, however, under a dual
copyright and sui generis database regime, digital models could find
protection under both.
IV. DATABASE PROTECTION FOR DIGITAL MODELS: IS THERE SUCH A
THING?
Over the past decade or so, the U.S. Congress has “considered—and

204.
205.
206.
207.
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considered—and considered data base protection.”208 Database
protection bills have been introduced in the 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th,
and 108th Congresses—none have become law.209 As a result, the strict
originality requirements of Feist apply to any potential copyright
protection for databases and other compilations in the United States.210
There has also been a debate about the constitutionality of these
congressional attempts to provide protection for databases beyond that
granted by copyright, based on the premise that such protection would
“alter the balance between protection and public access/competition
embodied in the Copyright and Patent Clause” of the U.S.
Constitution.211
The international approach to the problem consists of varying levels
of protection. A number of countries currently do not provide sui generis
protection, and others protect databases through copyright, subject to
varying interpretations of originality.212 The major international treaties
have also not done much to provide protection for “non-original”
databases.213 The Berne Convention, TRIPS Agreement, and WIPO
Copyright Treaty all condition database protection on the requirement
that they are independent “intellectual creations,”214 predicated on the
author’s contribution of “non-trivial, non-mechanical choices.”215
Additionally, WIPO’s proposed treaty on the legal protection of
databases remains in draft form years after its inception.216 The
European Union has taken some initiative on the issue. However, it
remains unclear whether the resulting Directive would protect “nonoriginal” databases such as the Meshwerks models.

208. Beard, supra note 21, at 1180.
209. Gervais, supra note 81, at 1142; see also Beard, supra note 21, at 1180; Database and
Collections of Information Misappropriation Act: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on
Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 108th
Cong. (2003) (statement of David O. Carson, General Counsel, U.S. Copyright Office) [hereinafter
Carson Statement], available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat092303.html (last visited
March 15, 2010); Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th
Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.3261 (last visited Apr.
15, 2010).
210. See Gervais, supra note 81, at 1131–37.
211. Id. at 1142.
212. See id. at 1148–57 (comparing protection in a variety of countries).
213. Id. at 1118.
214. Id. at 1114–18.
215. Gervais, supra note 81, at 1118.
216. Id. at 1119.

121

INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME 6

A. Sui Generis Protection Under the E.U. Database Directive
European Union Directive 96/9/EC on the legal protection of
databases217 (the Directive) provides sui generis protection for databases
that have been created by “the investment of considerable human,
technical and financial resources.”218 Apparently, the DirectorateGeneral introduced the Directive as an antidotal response to Feist.219 The
intent of the Directive was to expand protection beyond the “limited
reach of copyright caused by the originality/creativity requirement.”220
Under the Directive, injured parties can find relief, regardless of
copyright, whenever another party extracts or reutilizes a “qualitatively
or quantitatively substantial part of the database.”221
The Directive itself protects copyrightable and uncopyrightable data
that has economic value, and grants fifteen years of protection to the
maker of the database, separate and distinct from any potential copyright
protection.222 Protection under the Directive does not affect copyright
status in otherwise copyrightable data.223 In order for protection to
adhere, the maker of the database must have made a qualitatively or
quantitatively substantial investment in obtaining, verifying, or
presenting the data.224 Recital 17 of the Directive defines its scope:
Whereas the term “database” should be understood to
include literary, artistic, musical or other collections of
work or collections of other material such as texts,
sound, images, numbers, facts, and data; whereas it
should cover collections of independent works, data or
other material which are systematically or methodically
arranged and can be individually accessed; whereas this
means that a recording on an audiovisual,
cinematographic, literary or musical work as such does
not fall within the scope of this Directive.225
217. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on
the legal protection of databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 [hereinafter Directive], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996L0009:EN:HTML (last visited Apr.
15, 2010).
218. Beard, supra note 21, at 1178 nn.62–68.
219. Gervais, supra note 81, at 1120.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1123.
222. Beard, supra note 21, at 1178.
223. Id. at 1178–79.
224. Id. at 1179.
225. Directive, supra note 218, at recital 17; see also Beard, supra note 21, at 1179.
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Professor Joseph Beard analyzed potential protection for digital
scans of human subjects under both copyright and database theories.226
Of the scan data’s relationship to copyrightable subject matter, Beard
said, “The digital capture of the actor’s static visual data is the equivalent
of a three-dimensional photograph or a sculpture.”227 Beard also looked
at potential protection for scan data under the E.U. Database Directive,
and concluded that it is not clear that that theory would protect the data
either.228 Professor Beard felt that scan data might not fit within the
Directive’s requirement of independent data that “can be individually
accessed.”229 However, evinced by the Meshwerks’s employees resculpting of the scan data for the Toyota cars during the modeling
process, digital artists can access and manipulate each discrete data point
individually through modeling software, referenced by their distinct
XYZ coordinates. On the other hand, the application of these traditional
notions of accessibility and independent data to the realm of digital
modeling and its specific qualities remains untested, and Professor Beard
might well be correct. Commentators have said that the mere conversion
of analog material to a digital format is likely insufficient to qualify as a
substantial investment.230 However, substantial verification or updating
of this material might be.231 Whether it was this type of updating and
verification that Meshwerks engaged in after their initial scans remains
questionable. Indeed, some commentators have said recent cases in
Europe have shown that the Directive provides even less protection for
fact-based compilations than U.S. copyright law after Feist.232
In 2004, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) limited the scope of the
Directive’s protection when it clarified the amount of investment
required to obtain protection under the sui generis right.233 The court
articulated a “spin-off” theory, and held that substantial investment in
obtaining, presenting, or verifying pre-existing data would enable the
creator to benefit from protection, while investment in creating the data
would not.234 In holding that the Directive did not protect the investment
226. See Beard, supra note 21.
227. Id. at 1177.
228. Id. at 1179.
229. Id.
230. Gervais, supra note 81, at 1126.
231. Id.
232. Robert Clark, Sui Generis Database Protection: A New Start for the UK and Ireland?, 2 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 97, 98 (2007).
233. Gervais, supra note 81, at 1126.
234. Id. at 1127.
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at issue in the Fixtures Mktg. cases (football fixture data), the ECJ held
that
[f]inding and collecting the data which make up a
football fixture list do[es] not require any particular
effort on the part of the professional leagues. Those
activities are indivisibly linked to the creation of those
data, in which the leagues participate directly as those
responsible for the organization of football league
fixtures. Obtaining the contents of a football fixture list
thus does not require any investment independent of that
required for the creation of the data contained in that
list.235
Similarly in British Horseracing Bd. v. William Hill,236 the ECJ
stated that the effort and investment in organizing horse races and
collecting and verifying the large amounts of data at issue constituted
investment only in creating the data—not in obtaining, presentation, or
verification.237 Following these decisions by the ECJ, a Dutch court, in
Zoekallehuizen.nl v. NVM,238 attempted to make the distinction between
these different types of investment. That court held that creating property
descriptions and taking photographs of properties to be posted on a real
estate website did not qualify as substantial investment—despite the fact
that such investment required the expenditure of both time and
resources.239 This distinction between obtaining data and activities
which are “indivisibly linked” to the creation of data might frustrate the
attempts of a digitization firm such as Meshwerks in their attempt to
secure database rights in the E.U., because the data generated while
modeling the Toyota vehicles (even the manually sculpted data) was
likely the necessary byproduct of the undertaking itself. Thus, it was
created and not obtained, as required by the ECJ.
Indeed, the formidable volume of case law spawned by the Directive,
both in national courts and the ECJ, has, to the despair of database
makers everywhere, turned to “a pronounced hostility to affording either
235. Fixtures Mktg. Ltd. v. Oy Veikkaus Ab, 2004 E.C.R. I-10365 at [59] (emphasis added).
236. British Horseracing Board Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd. [2005] 1 CMLR 319.
237. Id., at [80], [39]–[41].
238. Arrondissementsrechtbank [District Court], Arnhem, Mar. 16, 2006, (Neth.), more details
available at
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken=true&searchtype=ljn&ljn=AV5236&u_ljn=
AV5236 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
239. Clark, supra note 232, at 99.
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copyright protection or sui generis protection to ‘factual’ databases”
because they lack originality or substantial investment.240 This hostility
appears to be in opposition to the intent of the Directive’s drafters,241
because it draws European database law closer, rather than away from,
the result in Feist.242 In the United Kingdom and Ireland, the
amendments to the CDPA and Copyright and Related Rights Act of
2000243 implementing the Directive now only protect works that
constitute the author’s own “intellectual creation,” “which seems to hold
compilations to a Feist-like standard”244 and represents a heightened
standard for original databases.245
V. CONCLUSION
It seems clear that copyright protects digital models, even those that
replicate reality, when they include elements of creativity, such as color,
shading, texturing, animation, and lighting. Additionally, it is clear that
copyright protects renderings of digital models, such as Studio
Macbeth’s images and video of Lincoln and Benjamin Button’s head in
Fincher’s film, as either artistic or audiovisual works. However, as the
Meshwerks studio discovered all too late, copyright and database laws in
the United States, and perhaps elsewhere, do not protect the basic models
themselves. Perhaps the digital artist’s sweat will secure protection in
those jurisdictions that recognize labor and skill as elements of
originality. Potentially, other theories based in contract, tort (including
misappropriation),246 or some other theory such as trespass to chattels247
240. Id. at 97.
241. Id.
242. The E.U. Database Directive defines a database as “a collection of independent works,
data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by
electronic or other means” and requires European Union member countries to provide harmonious
laws regarding copyright protection for databases. Directive, supra note 217, art. 1.2.
243. Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (Act No. 28/2000) (Ir.).
244. Fenzel, supra note 156, at 570. The United Kingdom amended the CDPA in 1997 by
enacting The Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations, 1997, S.I. 3032/1997 (U.K.), to
include protection for databases as literary works under section 3(1). The regulations added section
3(A), which provides “For the purposes of this Part a literary work consisting of a database is
original if, and only if, by reason of the selection or arrangement of the contents of the database the
database constitutes the author’s own intellectual creation.” CDPA, at 3(A); Fenzel, supra note
156, at 570 n.212.
245. Clark, supra note 232, at 97.
246. One such theory, though not completely relevant to the issue at hand, was delineated in
Nat’l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997), under the theory of Int’l News
Service v. Assoc’d Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) [hereinafter INS]. The Court defined a “hot news”
misappropriation claim that would survive preemption by federal copyright law, including the
following five elements “central to an INS claim”: the plaintiff generates or collects information at
some cost or expense; the value of the information is highly time-sensitive; the defendant's use of the
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may provide some answers for model creators in the U.S., although these
issues are outside the scope of this Article. The landmark originality and
creativity requirements of Feist protect the vitally important public
domain and provide free access to factual information by protecting
creativity, not investment. However, this lack of protection for databases
created through significant amounts of physical or financial investment
may prove economically unwise if it lowers incentive to create, although
this result has not been borne out in research on the results of
implementing the E.U. Database Directive.248 Perhaps, in this particular
situation—the entertainment world of three-dimensional virtual reality—
the incentives offered by any potential sui generis database right are too
minimal to be important. Perhaps, as one commentator put it,
“[c]opyright is not the proper vehicle to protect these non-creative, nonoriginal compilations,”249 and we should leave it to the other possible
theories to provide protection. In any event, the U.S. Congress may
continue to consider the merits of database protection beyond that
provided by copyright. If it does, it should do so with an eye to the
importance the Constitution places on preserving the public domain. If a
database protection act becomes inevitable, and it surely might given the
rising amount of information stored, organized, and available in digital
networks, Congress should pass legislation that will protect valuable
‘factual’ data compilations from unauthorized access and reutilization in
a way that preserves public access to information. However, until that
day comes, and even if it does, digital artists, entertainment companies,
actors, and digitizing companies need to understand the potential risks
involved and protect themselves through contract and technological data
protection measures.

information constitutes free-riding on the plaintiff's costly efforts to generate or collect it; the
defendant's use of the information is in direct competition with a product or service offered by the
plaintiff; and the ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff would so reduce the
incentive to produce the product or service that its existence or quality would be substantially
threatened. Id. at 852; Gervais, supra note 81, at 1137–39; Carson Statement, supra note 210, at II.
247. Gervais, supra note 81, at 1148 (indicating that this theory generally requires
unauthorized and burdensome access to a server and unauthorized use or injury to the database
owner); see also Ian C. Ballon, Bots, Screen Scraping, Content Aggregation and the Evolving
Doctrine of Database Trespass, CYBERSPACE LAW at 15, 21 (2001); Beard, supra note 21, at 1183;
Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
248. See
James
Boyle,
A
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Experiment,
22
Nov.
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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/4cd4941e-3cab-11d9-bb7b-00000e2511c8.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2010).
249. Gervais, supra note 81, at 1135.
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